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On May 29, 1986, the Los Angeles County Bar Association 
and Town Hall of California sponsored a debate at the Biltmore 
Hotel in Los Angeles on the resolution: "That all justices of the 
California Supreme Court appearing on the November 1986 
ballot should be retained." The Supreme Court Project is proud 
to publish in this Backgrounder the transcript of that lively, 
informative encounter. 
A much larger debate has been raging, of course, throughout 
California for more than a year about the state Supreme Court 
and November's judicial elections. The Biltmore meeting was 
unusual, however, in bringing together four exceptionally 
well-informed and articulate spokesmen for and against 
changing the membership of the Court next November. Gerald 
F. Uelmen, dean of the Law School at Santa Clara University, 
and Steven H. Shiffrin, law professor at the University of 
California, Los Angeles, Law School, argued for retention of all 
the justices on the ballot. 
Phillip E. Johnson - familiar to Backgrounder readers as the 
author of The Court on Trial, also published by The Supreme 
Court Project - and Stephen R. Barnett, both law professors at 
the University of California's Boalt Hall School of Law at 
Berkeley, opposed retention of Chief Justice Rose Bird 
"The existence," Professor Uelmen said at the Biltmore, "of a 
serious debate about the retention of Supreme Court justices is 
unprecedented in California." That debate involves many of the 
most important issues confronting the citizens not only of 
California, but of the entire United States. To choose wisely in 
November, voters must consider those issues thoughtfully and 
carefully. The Biltmore Debate will help them do so. 
We wish to thank the Los Angeles County Bar Association, 
Town Hall and the four debate participants for making possible 
this Supreme Court Project publication of The Biltmore Debate. 
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$4.00 
The Biltmore Debate 
Should the Justices be Retained? 
Phillip E. Johnson 
Stephen R. Barnett vs. 
Gerald F. Uelmen 




A Publication Of 
The Supreme Court Project 
Note: Nothing wrltt'n hflffl Is to be construed as necesssrl/y reflecting the views of The Supreme Court Project. 
Who's Telling the Truth? 
Once again, through a strained and unrealistic statutory construction, 
the majority has thwarted the obvious intent of the framers of, and voters 
for, Proposition 8 [The Victims' Bill of Rights]. 
- California Supreme Court Justices 
Malcolm Lucas and Stanley Mosk 
in a recent dissent. 
If I couldn't follow the law, I wouldn't sit here. 
- Chief Justice Rose Bird, quoted the 
day after the Proposition 8 decision 
was handed down. 
Who is right? Have Supreme Court decisions strayed from following 
the clear intent of the law? Or are the controversies involving California's 
Supreme Court merely disagreements as to what the law really means? 
To answer these questions, The Supreme Court Project is publishing the 
research, ideas and opinions of California's top experts on the major 
issues involved in the 1986 judicial elections. 
The Supreme Court Project's purpose is to provide opinion makers, 
educators, the business community and ordinary Californians with timely 
and concise, yet thorough, information on these critical issues. Our 
Backgrounders are designed to insure that responsible voices are heard 
throughout· California in the public debate on our state's highest court. 
They emphasize up-to-date research and analysis on the most important 
questions of the day. 
Phillip E. Johnson's The Court on Trial, our first Backgrounder, 
published last December, has been widely read and deba~ed in 
California's law schools, among judges and practicing attorneys, at 
public fora and in the news media. The Court on Trial figures 
prominently, as it happens, in the discussions we transcribe here. It's 
publication helped bring about the debate reproduced in this volume. 
Readers who wish to obtain a copy of The Court on Trial, or additional 
copies of The Biltmore Debate, should contact The Supreme Court 
Project directly (please see back cover for our address). To help cover 
our printing and mailing costs, we request a $2 donation for The Court 
on Trial and $4 for The Biltmore Debate. 
The Supreme Court Project was founded in 1985 as a nonpartisan 
organization dedicated to publishing research relevant to California's 
1986 judicial elections. Individuals, corporations, companies and 
political committees are eligible to support the Project through their 
donations. 
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Gerald F. Uelmen 
Opening Statement: 
THE EXISTENCE of a serious debate about the retention of 
Supreme Court justices is unprecedented in California. But 
controversial judges who write controversial opinions are not 
unprecedented in California. In 1966, Chief Justice Roger Traynor was 
roundly condemned for concurring in an opinion holding that an 
initiative that declared that Californians have the right to discriminate on 
the basis of race in the sale of their property was unconstitutional. 1 
Chief Justice Traynor was retained by a vote of 62 percent in 1966, at 
that time the smallest vote of affirmation ever received by a justice of the 
Supreme Court. 
In 1974, Chief Justice Donald Wright was condemned for his 
opinion declaring the death penalty unconstitutional. 2 He was confirmed 
by a rate of 70 percent. The suggestion that Traynor or Wright be 
removed as Chief Justice of California was hardly taken seriously by 
responsible politicians or scholars. What's different about 1986? The 
most significant difference is that in 1966 and 197 4 the governor who 
appointed Chief Justice Traynor and Chief Justice Wright was still in 
office. In 1986, the contest is fueled by the prospect of a political 
opportunity to reshape the Court drastically. 
Let's not kid ourselves about why millions of dollars are being spent 
on a mail and media campaign: to create three vacancies on the 
California Supreme Court and three opportunities to change the results 
in decided cases. 
As the affirmative in this debate, we contend that the current 
campaign threatens two fundamental principles of an independent 
judiciary: first of all, Supreme Court justices should not be politically 
accountable for the results of their decisions and, secondly, political 
philosophy should not be considered in evaluating the performance of 
justices. I'm going to focus on these two premises because I suspect 
that it is here we will disagree most sharply in today's debate. The 
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reason I suspect that is because I've read Professor Johnson's 
Backgrounder paper [Supreme Court Project Backgrounder The Court 
on Trial, by Phillip E. Johnson, who is also the fourth participant in 
this debate] - I've even read the footnotes. And it's quite clear that he 
believes the results of the Court's decisions are relevant, particularly the 
death penalty decisions. He also apparently feels that political 
philosophy is highly relevant since he frequently refers to particular 
justices as "liberals" or "liberal activists" and defines the symbolic 
importance of this contest as a test of public acceptance of judicial 
activism. I sincerely hope that at some point in this debate Professor 
Johnson will favor us with a definition of just what a "liberal activist" 
judge is and whether he would advocate the removal of all liberal 
activist judges; if not, which ones? We'll be waiting with bated breath 
for the answer. 
Now let me turn to our first principle: that Supreme Court justices 
should not be politically accountable for the results of their decisions. 
There are three cogent reasons why the results of decisions should be 
disregarded. 
First , because holding justices politically accountable for the results 
of. their decisions will inevitably produce result-oriented justice. By 
usmg box scores to evaluate them, we're delivering a very strong 
subliminal message to the justices. We're saying: before you vote, you 
better think about how this result will look on the six o'clock news or 
in tom?rrow's newspaper headlines. And that message directly 
contradicts the message that we deliver in the California Code of Judicial 
Conduct: "A judge must be unswayed by partisan interests, public 
clamor, or fear of criticism." 3 In 1982, a senatorial candidate 
announced that he would urge the defeat of justices if they voted to 
strike down Proposition 8. In 1986, the governor announced he was 
waiting to reveal his position on certain justices until he saw the results 
in pending death penalty cases. It has quickly become part of the 
political terrain in California to use support or opposition in retention 
elections in not so subtle attempts to influence pending cases. That, I 
submit, is an inevitable result of holding justices politcally accountable 
for the results of their decisions. · 
The second reason why results should be ignored is that the removal 
of. a ~ustice has no effect on those results. If we truly respect the 
pnnc1ple of stare decisis, we don't set out to change decisions by 
changing the justices. There's a name for that process: it's called court 
packing. We have a more direct remedy available to reverse unpopular 
decisions. By legislation or constitutional amendment we can overrule 
decisions that we disagree with. In 1982, with the enactment of 
Proposition 8, we did precisely that. The Court subsequently upheld 
the constitutionality of Proposition 8, thus officiating at the interment of 
50 of its own precedents.4 
The third reason that results should not be considered is simple 
fairness. Very few of the complex issues that we ask the Court to 
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resolve every year are clear-cut. Unanimous opinions have become the 
exception rather than the rule, and competent justices will be found on 
both sides of nearly every issue presented to the Court. 
The results really tell us very little about a justice's competence, but 
results are susceptible to distortion and misrepresentation in a political 
campaign. No better example of that can be offered than the death 
penalty cases which have unfortunately become the centerpiece of the 
anti-retention campaign. The Court's record in death penalty cases is 
simplistically reduced to a box score: 51 to three in favor of the 
criminals, as though the only issue the Court were deciding was 
whether to favor vicious criminals or hapless victims. In reality, every 
death penalty case involves a complex review of three factual 
determinations: the finding of guilt of first-degree murder, which the 
Court has affirmed at a rate of 67 percent, the finding of special 
circumstances, which the Court has affirmed at a rate of 75 percent 
under the 1977 death penalty law and 25 percent under the Briggs 
Initiative, and finally, the choice of death over life without parole, 
affirmed at a rate of 25 percent under the 1977 law, zero under the 
Briggs Iniative. 
There are two startling things about these results. They demonstrate 
that the real problem is the sloppy draftsmanship of Briggs rather than 
any hidden agenda of the Court. And the vast majority of reversals have 
simply been remands for new hearings because the jury was improperly 
instructed pursuant to the Briggs Initiative. Murderers are not being 
turned loose in our streets. The effort to turn the retention election 
campaign into a referendum on the death penalty is simply a crass 
attempt to turn public ignorance and fear to political advantage. That 
too, I submit, is an inevitable consequence of holding justices 
politically accountable for the results of their decisions. 
Let me turn to our second fundamental premise: that political 
philosophy should not be considered in evaluating the performance of 
justices. Clearly, political philosophy is not ignored when justices are 
appointed. Liberal governors tend to appoint liberal justices, just as 
conservative governors tend to appoint conservatives. We've been 
blessed, or cursed, with both in California on a regurlarly recurring 
basis. 
Once we start using the retention elections to remove the liberals 
during conservative eras, or the conservatives during liberal eras, 
we've added a new ingredient which seriously threatens the 
constitutional mixture. It's no answer to suggest that their philosophy 
renders justices unfit because they are biased, especially if our goal is 
simply to replace them with justices with the opposite bias. Ultimately, 
we must recognize that political philosophy is qualitatively different 
from that kind of bias that renders a judge unfit. 
I've never heard a lawyer go into court and make a motion to 
disqualify the judge because the judge was too liberal, or too 
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conservative. Yet today, for the first time, we are hearing a serious 
suggestion that judges be removed from office because they are "too 
liberal." We contend that the political philosophy of the justices is just 
as irrelevant as the results of their decisions. Thank you. 
(Applause) 
Notes 
1. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Ca1.2d 529 (1966). 
2. People v. Anderson, 6 Ca1.3d 628 (1972). 
3. California Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(A)(1). 
4. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal.3d 236 (1982); in Re Lance W., 37 
Cal.3d 873 (1985). FIRST, A point logic. In taking the negative on the proposition 
all the justtces on the ballot should be retamed, I am not necessarily 
asserting, of course, that none of them should be retained. In fact, my 
position is that only Justice Bird should not be retained. I can't 
speak for Professor Johnson, but I plan to vote for all the other justices 
on the ballot. 
In explaining why I oppose retention of Chief Justice Bird, I want to 
try to address in my opening and rebuttal remarks - and this may require 
some fast talking - three issues. 
First, I will talk about California's election system for the retention of 
Supreme Court justices. In particular, I will consider whether the 
framers of the state constitution necessarily made a mistake in not 
providing life tenure instead, a mistake that the voters should try to 
remedy at the polls by voting automatically for the retention of any 
justice on the ballot. 
Second, I will discuss what I think is the appropriate standard to 
apply in deciding whether to vote against a justice, and in particular a 
chief justice. 
Third, I will apply that standard to Chief Justice Bird with respect to 
one telltale case. 
The main argument for retaining Chief Justice Bird appears to be, not 
that she has performed effectively as Chief Justice, not that she has 
demonstrated the impartiality, the fair-mindedness, the good judgment 
required of the Chief Justice of California, not that she has earned the 
respect and trust that the people of California ought to have in their 
Chief Justice. The argument appears to be, rather, in the actual words 
of the Sacramento Bee editorial endorsing reconfirmation, that Chief 
Justice Bird and her colleagues "have committed no crimes and done 
nothing to violate their oaths." 
An affirmative vote is therefore required, the argument goes, in L"le 
5 
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name of judicial independence. The alternative is said to be "Gallup Poll 
justice," or I suppose in California we ought to say "Field Poll justice." 
Professor Uelmen has talked about result-oriented justice. Justice 
Reynoso reportedly stated recently, "It would be a tragedy if any justice 
is not reconfirmed because the justices would then have to look at who 
has political power and money and not at the Constitution." 
Judicial independence is, of course, a legitimate and important 
concern. In response to concern, it deserves emphasis that 
California constitution, though it does not provide life tenure, does 
afford spacious protection for judicial independence. The constitution 
provides for a special type of election for appellate judges, an election 
in which the judge runs on his or her record against nobody, and in 
which the next governor - not the electorate, and not a governor whose 
identity is known at the time of the election - appoints the replacement 
for a defeated justice. 
The system also provides for lengthy terms of 12 years. While 
appointments to unfinished terms often shorten a justice's initial term -
unfortunately, in my view- Chief Justice Bird has had nine years since 
her appointment in 1977. 
These lengthy terms protect judicial independence in at least two 
ways. 
One way operates in the justice's own mind. I find cause for wonder 
in all these assertions that if justices face the risk of non-retention after a 
term on the California Supreme Court, they will be led to decide cases 
not by looking to the constitution and to their consciences, but to who 
has money and political power. Is this not, as Professor Gideon 
Kanner has pointed out recently, a slur on the integrity and the 
commitment to principle of the men and women on the California 
bench? Are California's justices really so afraid of being thrown out 
into the harsh world after 12 years on the California Supreme Court that 
they would forsake their oaths and their consciences, and pander to 
public whims, in order to avoid it? I think not. 
The other way lengthy terms protect the justices operates in the minds 
of the voters. Twelve years, or, in the case of Chief Justice Bird, nine 
years, is a long time. It is long enough for the public to forget many 
things that might be held against a justice. In Chief Justice Bird's case, 
for example, it is long enough for apparently everyone in the state to 
have forgotten her disastrous act in 1978 in calling for an investigation 
of the Supreme Court as a result of the election-day article on the 
Tanner1 case in the Los Angeles Times. This was an act not only of 
monumental poor judgment on Chief Justice Bird's part, but of 
arrogance as well, since she did it without consulting the other 
Supreme Court justices. 
The resulting investigation was a catastrophe for the Supreme Court, 
shattering to its judicial image and public respect, debilitating to its 
self-confidence and internal spirit. It was very possibly the worst thing 
to happen to the Court in its entire history (Chief Justice Bird's own 
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apfJOHltment possibly excepted). 
not understand why this monumental error, this act of poor 
judgment arrogance that did so damage to the institution 
entrusted to her leadership, is not itself a sufficient ground for denying 
Chief Justice a second term. But, as I say, eight years is a long 
and nobody but me seems even to remember. 
system thus provides protection for judicial 
•u"''"~-'"u'""'J'"'"'· Under this system no justice has ever been 
defeated. Even despite opposition and 
provocation for the polls show that the justices other than Chief 
Justice Bird are running well ahead of their nay-sayers. 
But the the state constitution not provide the ultimate in 
judicial independence, life tenure. Was this simply a regrettable error on 
their part? I would like to suggest some reasons why it may not have 
been. 
In the first place, question is not whether life tenure for judges is a 
good or bad thing in general. We have life tenure in this country for 
federal judges. I myself think that is a good thing, but in any event it is 
a fact, and there is no serious proposal to change it. The question for 
then, is whether it was a mistake to deny life tenure to 
in a system that does give life tenure to federal judges. 
constitutional rights are protected by the ultimate 
~-'"'''uu,w .... .., that life tenure provides. Hence many of the 
,. ... ,,TY'i"'"t" one hears in this campaign, to the effect that constitutional 
will in jeopardy if California's justices are denied reelection, 
arguments are simply beside the point. 
Then, given that constitutional rights are protected by the life tenure of 
federal judges, there may be sound reasons for the public's desire, 
manifested in all but two or three states, to keep state court judges on a 
shorter leash. A state court like the California Supreme Court in 
important ways has more discretionary power, more power to create 
more law that has more impact on people's lives, than even the United 
States Supreme Court. 
First, state courts, unlike federal courts, can make common law. This 
is, of course, a very expansive domain. Many of the most criticized 
decisions of the California Supreme Court have been common law 
decisions - the Court's famous tort decisions, for example, or the 
decision last year creating a right to for public employees.2 
..., .... , .... ,ll'u. the state statutes that state courts interpret cover a broader 
and deeper expanse human activities than federal statutes do. The 
California Unruh Act, for example, applies to "all business 
establishments of every kind whatsoever." 3 
Third, and most relevant here - regarding the case that I hope to refer 
to - state courts, unlike federal courts, have as one of their major 
functions the refereeing of state politics. The California Supreme Court 
does this, for example, in its frequent decisions holding ballot initiatives 
valid or invalid, or in reapportionment decisions that can determine 
THE 
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1. People v. Tanner, Cal.3d 16 I, 1978). 
2. County No. 2 v. Los 
38 Ca1.3d 564 ( 1985). 
3. Code Section 51. See, e.g., Isbister v. Boys' 
Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal.3d 72 (1985). 
DEBATE 
of 
Steven H. Shiffrin 
Opening Statement: 
I FIRST became involved in events like this when I got a call from 
Jerry Uelmen, my former debate partner in college. He called me up 
and asked if I had "signed the petition on behalf of the California 
Supreme Court?" I asked, "What petition?" He said, "It's going all 
around U.C.L.A. Haven't you signed this petition?" I said, "Jerry, I 
d.on't kno~. what Y.ou're talking about." He said, "Well, would you 
s1gn a peutwn saymg that you are in favor of the reelection of the 
Court?" I said, "Sure." He said, "Good, then can you be down here 
Monday morning for a press conference in which we announce the 
results?" I said, "All right. I'll come." 
[At the press conference] we announced that 255law professors in the 
state were supporting the reelection of the Court. A "point of logic" -
w~ kne.w that each ju.stice on the ballot would be supported by what we 
smd. Smce then, I thmk, the number has grown to 287. The other side 
has at least two law professors in public [Phillip Johnson and Stephen 
Ba~ett]: ~ideon Kanner here today is a third. They have yet to get 
the1r pet1t1on of the law professors on the other side. We're waiting. 
There had been television cameras at the press conference and I 
thought, if I'm going to be on television, I ought to look at it. When I 
went home, here's what I saw on the various channels. I saw myself or 
Jerry pronouncing some half-sentence about the independence of the 
Court. Then on each of the television channels I saw Ross Johnson a 
state legislator, who had gone out that day to a pond, with ducks 
quacking in the background. 
(Laughter) 
It was marvelous television. At his press conference, Johnson talked 
about a brutal murder of two young boys. He said the two little boys 
wouldn't be able to come there to hear the ducks quack, but "thanks to 
the Court" the person who had killed those boys might one day be able 
to hear those ducks. 
9 
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of on television and on radio. That is what they covered. 
No one thought to ask what the issue in the case1 was. I mean - did the 
California Supreme Court decide to let Mr. Memro have a reversal of 
the judgment on the ground that there were ducks quacking and this 
was a brutal murder? No. 
The public does not yet know what the issue in that case was because 
~he broadcasters, the television people, the politicians and the special 
~nterests have been unwilling to talk about The politicians and special 
mterests don't want that to be discussed. It is an indication, I think, of 
why this is a unique election. This is a unique election because, despite 
Professor Barnett's abstract discussion of the state constitution, this is 
the first election in the history of the state of California in which 
politicians and special interest groups have spent millions of dollars in 
an effort to influence its outcome. This is the first election in which 
corporations, insurance companies, banks and agribusiness have 
invested large sums in an effort to pack the Court. 
~ecent~y,_ a farm group - the Farm Bureau -pledged $100,000 to 
Cnme Vtcttms for Court Reform [a campaign committee seeking the 
defeat of Chief Justice Rose Bird and of Justices Cruz Reynoso and 
Joseph Grodin]. If you think the Farm Bureau is worried about the 
death penalty cases, I submit that you might have mis-analyzed the 
politics. 
(Laughter) 
Agribusiness wants new justices to make decisions about collective 
bargaining for workers and about the impact of agribusiness's activity 
on the safety and quality of the environment. Those are the kinds of 
things they are really interested in. But the ads will be talking about the 
death penalty cases. 
Professor Barnett says that the state constitution authorizes all this. 
But the state constitution does not tell you how to vote in this election. 
The state constitution allows you to decide that you do not want to have 
a campaign, now or in the future, in which the justices of the California 
Supren:e Court are going to be subjected to the kinds of misleading and 
deceptive attacks that have occurred. In other words, if you want to 
have elections in the future in which judges are looked at in terms of 
whether they are pro-environment or anti-environment liberal or . ' conservative, you can vote to get rid of any particular justice you like. 
That _would be a signal to the politicians and the special interest groups 
that m the future they can affect elections by pouring in millions of 
dollars. 
If you want to tell the politicians and the special interest groups to lay 
off the Court, to use their money, power and influence in the 
Legislature, but_kee~ o_ne branch of government independent of money, 
power and publtc optmon, then what you do is you reelect the justices. 
Now it is a bit difficult to respond to Professor Barnett's remarks. 
For one thing, they are, I believe, laced with contradictions. He first 
tells you that since there are very long terms, it takes an elephant's 
11 
memory to remember things and that everyone forget. He then 
stands up and announces that Chief Justice Bird is arrogant, that 
everyone else has forgotten (but he remembers) that she didn't \.-U111>uu 
with people and called for a public investigation of the Court, that this 
was outrageous, so forth and so on. 
Well, everyone has not forgotten. There is a book called Framed: The 
New Right Attack on Chief Justice Rose Bird and the Courts, by Betty 
Here's what she says about that issue: 
[Bird's] request for the investigation would itself become a 
source controversy .... Some of the justices were Bird 
realizes her lack of consultation is a justifiable criticism. But at the time 
she wrote the letter [requesting the investigation], it was obvious that at 
least some of the accusations being made against the court were being 
made from within. It was obvious the documents that were released to 
establish false or half-truthful impressions probably were being 
released by a Supreme Court justice, for no one else had access to 
them. She thought it unlikely those people would want an investigation 
of the court." 
I think her failure to consult, in Catholic theology, might be regarded 
as a venial sin. 
(Laughter) 
That there was a public investigation of the Court, given the very 
serious charges being made, it seems to me was a good thing. And it 
seems to me that it is best that the truth be aired. I challenge Professor 
Barnett to come back up here and explain to us why these matters 
should be kept in private. 
Secondly, Professor Barnett tells us that it's O.K. to vote against 
justices on the basis of results. He has one "telltale" case - he runs out 
of time, conveniently, not letting us know what the telltale case is. 
(Laughter) 
And he says, not to worry, the federal courts are there, and the federal 
courts protect federal rights; therefore, the independence of the courts is 
not at stake. Without even finishing the sentence, he goes on to tell us 
about all the other things the California courts do, the vital and 
important issues that affect our lives. My response to that is this: 
independence of the courts doesn't mean just federal constitutional 
rights. Independence of the courts means that the courts decide cases on 
the merits before them; that they are not, in environmental cases, going 
to be worried about whether or not agribusiness will be giving 
contributions against them, or, on the other side, whether liberal 
Democratic groups are going to be campaigning against Lucas and 
Panelli, claiming in the next election that they're "in bed with toxic 
polluters" or something like that. That's the kind of election we're 
going to have in the future if you allow this to continue. 
Independence of the courts means that justices ought to make 
decisions without worrying about being taunted with the suggestion that 
they're responsive to contributions. A prime example of this particular 
12 THE BILTMORE DEBATE 
does say? He says, will necessarily 
''"'"·~'"'"' role in the campaign. But the be aware that 
are not necessarily disinterested. Chief Justice Bird has 
campaign funds primarily from the trial lawyers who 
representing injured persons in lawsuits. These lawyers 
of money to contribute" - get this - "in part because the 
J u'""'" and her colleagues enormously increased the 
individuals to recover substantial damages 
insurance companies and taxpayers. Plaintiffs' lawyers 
at least a of each judgment...." 
He ultimately that "Chief has been 
a dedicated the 
Do you the picture? The picture is th~s: . . the cases 
giving money to the lawyers. The lawyers gtve 1~ back to B.trd, and .the 
circle continues. I submit there might be another mterpretatton. It m1ght 
Notes 
that chief justice of the California Court wants to 
the rights of victims of unsafe products. 
New on 
Medsger, 1983, The 
on by 
Project, Santa '""u"u'"'u' 
Rose Bird and the 
New York, New 
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PROFESSOR is the hire to me in a 
1uv"'"''"' case before a friendly audience. 
going to use the few minutes available to me to uu'''"'u'"' 
death penalty Although the death cases are not most """"''"''"~t 
part of the Court's work this issue has taken on .enormous 
in the public debate because it stands as a dramatic example 
fairly be called judicial civil disobedience. 
The essential facts can be stated quickly. The death penalty been 
upheld as constitutional by the United States Supreme Court, the 
California specifically states that the death does not 
violate any provision of our state constitution. We have 
statutes in effect since 1977, but they have not been enforced. As 
date, the California Supreme Court has decided nearly 60 
cases, and has reversed the penalty in all but three. It 
misleading, however, to say that the verdicts in even these three cases 
have been affirmed because the cases remain in further litigation. 
For example, the death sentence in People v. Jackson1was affifl!led in 
1980 - yes, that's 1980 - but the Court has granted further heanngs to 
determine whether the verdict in that case is proportionate to the 
imposed in thousands of other homicide cases from around 
even the U.S. Court has held that such 
review is not constitutionally required.2 This Iai·-n::at:.nutg 
certain to take many years, and of course new issues will come 
by that time that will require further hearings. 
The record Chief Justice Bird in death cases is •un.'"''"'"" 
noteworthy; she has voted to reverse every death 
exception. We are told, however, that we may not draw 
conclusion from this record. The Chief Justice and lHvn•u"' 
the current majority deny any intent to impede the death penalty. 
are just to see that it is carried out fairly. blame for 
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lies with voters who passed the 
penalty statute in 1978, called the Initiative, 
which was drafted and overbroad. measure 
replaced the penalty statute enacted by the Legislature which 
the California Supreme Court upheld as constitutional by a four-to-three 
vote, with dissenting in 1980. If the voters had left the law 
1977 law been in 
attempt to shift the 
... , •. ""'''~ the electorate 
to the record of Chief Justict Rose 
reverse every single death verdict under both the and the 1978 
statutes, and on grounds so broad - often in opinions urging the Court 
·to go further than it has - that no one familiar the opinions can 
doubt that she would be pitching a shutout even if the Briggs initiative 
had never been conceived. It's possible that some other members of the 
Court might have voted to affirm more death sentences if the cases had 
been tried under the 1977 legislation. But this would mean only that 
these additional cases would continue being tied up in further review on 
the proportionality issue along with People v. Jackson. 
I freely concede that the Briggs Initiative was poorly drafted and 
should never have been passed. The initiative was particularly foolish 
because it played into the hands of a set of justices who were already 
committed to preventing the death penalty from being carried out. In 
fact, the controversial parts of the Briggs Initiative gave prosecutors 
very little of any real value. 
Consider the most important of the so-called "defects" in the Briggs 
Initiative, the provision that made killings committed in the perpetration 
of certain dangerous felonies eligible for the death penalty without a 
requirement that the jury find the defendant actually intended to kill 
somebody. The California Supreme Court decided in 1983 that intent 
ought to be required and has reversed dozens ofpre-1983 death verdicts 
because of the absence of this intent instruction. In all these cases the 
evidence that the defendant intended to kill was overwhelming, and the 
verdicts would have been the same if the intent instruction had been 
given. A problem exists only because the California Supreme Court 
waited five years before telling the prosecutors that it was necessary to 
give the instruction and then applied the new rule retroactively to all the 
cases pending on appeal. Despite the state constitution's express 
command that a judgment may not be reversed for procedural error 
unless a miscarriage of justice resulted, the Court majority has strained 
mightily to find some way to justify finding that failure to give the 
instruction was always prejudicial. I could give any number of 
examples - my favorite is People v. Fuentes,3 where Chief Justice Bird 
speculated that the robber might have shot the Brinks guard five times at 
short range because he wanted to make the guard drop the money bag, 
not to kill him. 
Phillip E. Johnson: Opening 15 
(Laughter) 
In another case, majority speculated that a contract killer who 
executed three persons, pausing to reload the shotgun each time in 
between, might have lacked criminal intent because he used drugs.4 
Anyone who doubts that Chief Justice Bird has been exploiting 
opportunities to "stonewall" the public on capital punishment should 
study the 1985 decision in People v. Brown,5 where the 
Court death sentence of a man who kidnapped, raped and 
murdered a 15-year-old on her way to school. The majority 
reversed because the trial court gave a standard instruction asking the 
jury not to "be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, 
compassion, prejudice, public opinion or public feelings." This 
platitudinous instruction is on the whole to the benefit of the defense 
and automatic reversal on this basis is absurd, but I'm pursuing a 
different point. 
One of the penalty issues argued in all the Briggs Initiative cases is 
that the standard penalty instruction is defective because it uses the 
word "shall" rather than "may," and thus fails adequately to convey the 
point that a jury has wide-open discretion to show mercy. In the seven 
years that the initiative has been in effect, prosecutors have repeatedly 
begged the Court to give a decision on the validity of this instruction 
and to tell them, or rather to tell the trial courts, what instruction ought 
to be given if the statutory one is defective. The Court has again and 
again put off these requests, saying it was unnecessary to reach the 
"shall instruction" issue because the Court planned to reverse anyway 
on other issues like the sympathy instruction. Finally, in People v. 
Brown the prosecutors managed to shame the majority into deciding the 
question and even into approving an alternate instruction that would 
pass muster. Because of this belated action, trial judges no longer have 
to guess what instruction the Court wants. 
Chief Justice Bird objected to this overdue but welcome action. She 
asked why it was necessary for the Court to reach this instruction now. 
If the Court could delay giving trial judges guidance on how to instruct 
jurors correctly for seven years, why could it not wait seven more? No 
doubt Bird's supporters will tell us this is an example of her customary 
judicial restraint, refusing to reach constitutional questions 
unnecessarily. Nonsense. 
(Laughter) 
Bird's opinion in People v. Brown is the work of a justice who wants 
to make it as hard as possible for the trial courts to do the job right, in 
order to make sure the Court does not run out of excuses to reverse 
death sentences. 
I am not offended by the Court's records in the death cases because I 
am an enthusiastic supporter of capital punishment. Althought I am 
persuaded that the death penalty is neither immoral nor unconstitutional, 
I am impressed by the argument that trying to impose it under present 
conditions does more harm than good. I respect persons who oppose 
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-.,auu,a• punishment openly and by honest means, in the Legislature, 
public opinion, and even in the judiciary. What I do not respect 
is a justice who pretends to acknowledge the principle that it is 
ultimately for the public to decide whether the death penalty is legitimate 
in California, but who creates an elaborate obstacle course of legal 
trickery to make sure that the penalty is never carried out. This strategy 
of obstruction by sophistry has predictably brought the Court into 
disrepute and it has trivialized the legitimate moral case that can be made 
against capital punishment. Instead of debating as we ought to -
whether life imprisonment is sufficient penalty for persons who commit 
horrible murders- we find ourselves debating whether a contract killer 
or a robber who fired bullets into his victim at short range lacked the 
intent to kill. No wonder support for capital punishment in the public is 
skyrocketing. 
We've heard much talk about judicial independence in these days, as if 
independence meant the inherent right of high court judges to do exactly 
as they please. Our California constitution does protect judicial 
independence and that independence will be secure as long as the courts 
remember that the purpose of independence is to preserve the rule of 
law, not to guarantee that we will be ruled by judges. 
(Applause) 
Notes 
1. People v. Jackson, 28 Cal.3d 264 (1980). 
2. After the debate, two well-informed lawyers came to the podium to 
tell me that the issue currently being litigated in Jackson is not the broad 
issue of "proportionality" but the narrower question of whether there is 
any discrimination in the application of the death penalty based on the 
race of either the defendant or the victim. The essential point is that the 
inquiry involves comparing thousands of cases and many years of 
litigation, and the issues to be considered in this comparative review 
can be expanded at any time. 
3. People v. Fuentes, 40 Cal.3d 629 (1985). 
4. People v. Hamilton, 41 Cal.3d 211 (1985). Following the 
appointment of Justice Paneli to replace Justice Kaus, the Court granted 
a rehearing in this case. 
5. People v. Brown, 40 Cal.3d 512, modified, 41 Cal.3d 439 (e) 
(1985). 
initial premise that I 
iJVllHAI~<u.q accountable for the their ae•cts:ton:s. 
concern with holding judges politically "'"'"'uunlau•c; 
for the results decisions is we end up with 
justice. Now the suggestion seems to be that that's really a slur on the 
~ntegrity of the judges, to suggest that somehow they are to be 
mflue~ced by the fact that politicians are endorsing or not 
endorsmg them based on how they vote in particular cases. 
I have every confidence in the integrity of the justices who are now 
on the Court. I ~nk they've demonstrated their independence, but, as 
on~ of them put 1t rec~nt~y - retired Justice Kaus, "It's hard to ignore the 
extstence of a crocodtle m your bathtub." I think even a justice who is 
de~oted to the rule of law, even a justice with integrity cannot help but 
be mfluenced by the fact that ultimately, his or her performance in office 
is not going to be measured by whether they have lived up to the 
canons of judicial ethics. It's going to be measured simply by 
or not the results of decisions are popular or unpopular. 
Now let me turn to the death penalty for a moment. Professor 
Johnson suggests that the consistency of the Chief Justice's voting 
rec~~d - 5~ reversals, zero affirmances - somehow gives rise to a 
legttlmate mference that she is carrying out some sort of hidden agenda 
to preclude the carrying out of the death penalty law in California. I find 
great difficulty drawing that kind of inference simply from the results 
and I think it gets back to that question of holding the justices politically 
accountable for the results. Would Professor Johnson draw the same 
inference, for example, with respect to Chief Justice Donald Wright 
whose voting record in death penalty cases was 172 reversals, zerd 
17 
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affirmances. I doubt that he would because 
at the that Chief 
find most of those cases, 
pn~ceoeJtll which had previously been cuu.•vuu""''"·' 
precisely the same thing is 
cases, that what the Court is doing is 
that's what we want to do. 
Stephen Barnett 
Rebuttal: 
I WAS saying that I thought the proposed standard .of !'lar~~w 
competence--can the judge tum out documents that look hke JUdtctal 
opinions?, and so forth--is too narrow. One reason it's too narrow ~s 
that it doesn't perform the function of maintaining public confidence m 
the judiciary, which is what I think judicial elections are about. Such a 
standard is toothless and feckless. As all of us here today know, any 
decent lawyer can tum out competent legal arguments, and hence 
competent judicial opinions, for any position he or she wants to reach. 
Indeed, the justice doesn't have to be a decent lawyer, because.h~ or 
she has law clerks and research attorneys who can turn out the opm10ns 
if the justice can't. 
I think the standard that should apply is what I would call a standard 
of competence broadly defined. This standard inclu~es questions such 
as: Does the justice have common sense and good Judgment? Has the 
justice shown himself or herself to be f~ir-~ind~d ~n?- impartial? Has 
the justice shown a due respect for the hm1ts of JUdtctal power, rather 
than an undue readiness to write his or her values into the law? I think 
for a chief justice the standard has additional elements, because of the 
symbolic role, and also the very powerful administrative role, of the 
chief justice. 
All these elements come down, I think, to the question of public 
confidence. It's not a question, as our opponents have been su.ggesting, 
simply of agreeing or disagreeing with the result~. Constd~r, f~r 
example, Chief Justice Earl Warren. Many people dtsagreed wtth h1s 
results. However, in a time of national crisis, after the assassination of 
President Kennedy, President Johnson thought that Earl Warren was 
the one person in the country who had the public respect and trust 
needed to be the head of the assassination commission. 
Would anyone seriously claim that Chief Justice Bird has that.kind_of 
respect and trust? I think it's essential for the people of Cahfomta, 
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and trust in their Justice. 
were '-'H<U!<;Ou14.u14, 
Ten years U'-''"-"'v· 
" the \:wnrPrnP 
that the old should be 
Chief Justice 
her, that the uemc~cr::mc 
Republicans should be 
happened was in 
the referendum. But the legislators elected under course 
heavily Democratic, and they came back to and enacted a 
new plan. This time they protected districts of enough incumbent 
Republicans to get a two-thirds vote that protected the plan from a 
referendum. Those districts went into effect, giving the Democrats a 
lock on the Legislature for the 1980s. 
Well, what about this decision? 
I think in the first place it quite arguably reflected partisanship by 
Chief Justice Bird. But in any event it surely reflected very bad 
judgment on Chief Justice Bird's part, and thus a failure of competence 
in the broad sense. In this case, of all cases, the Supreme Court should 
have remained non-partisan and even-handed and let the parties fight 
out the political battle in the political arena. Chief Justice Bird did not 
do that. By the barest majority- a four-to-three majority, with Justices 
Kaus, Mosk and Richardson dissenting - and with a crucial fourth vote 
provided by an associate justice of the Court of Appeal, who was 
sitting pro tern under assignment by Chief Justice Bird, Chief Justice 
Bird threw the Court behind the Democrats. 
The result is not just Democratic control of the Legislature for the 
decade. The result is that almost all the incumbents in the Legislature 
are locked in. Therefore we don't have much left of electoral politics for 
the Legislature in California. Therefore we have initiatives instead. And 
therefore, also, we have all the attention focused on this year's judicial 




Stephen R. Barnett: Rebuttal 21 
Notes 
L Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Ca1.3d 638 (1982). 
2. Legislature v. Reinecke (Reinecke I), 6 Cal.3d 595 (1972). 
Steven H. Shiffrin 
Rebuttal: 
WE STILL wait with bated breath for Professor Johnson, even in 
the .safe!y o~ the last. rebuttal, to tell us what liberal activism is, to tell us 
wh.1~h JUStices he m supports and doesn't support, and we're 
walt!ng for Professor Johnson to repudiate implication that the Chief 
Justice has voted to uphold the rights of victims in tort suits in 
response to campaign contributions. ' 
Finally, in the fading moments of the last rebuttal, from Mr. Barnett 
we heard ~bout the telltale case and we heard his standard. Here's his 
standard, mven~ed purely out of his imagination. The standard you 
"'"'Ju•u rely on 1s "broad confidence in the judiciary." He says Earl 
Warren would ~a":e been reele~ted, Earl Warren was appointed to the 
Commtsswn, and Ch1ef Justice Bird could not have been 
thPrA+ . -.ro Justice Bird must go. , 
Not much. o! an ~rgument, I think. Chief Justice Bird has had more 
!han four mdhon vu~ually unanswered dollars poured into a campaign 
m ~n atte~pt to get nd of her. Believe me, if there'd been an election for 
~ Chtef Justtce Warren, never would have gotten the South and the 
would have poured in against him. If Professor Bam~tt really 
;nants to press. a federal ~nalogy, let's think about what it would be like 
1f we had natwnal electwns over Brennan, Rehnquist, Marshall, or 
would be a ~olitical If it's a nightmare at 
, I a mghtmare at the California level too. 
that s . . at stake. What is at stake is an attempt to transfonn 
poht1cs. . we have operated essentially on an 
~-' .... '""''uu•"'' Justices have been retained. What these two 
. want to do is t? substitute a "broad confidence" model or 
somethmg - essentially to an appointment model an 
}n which they'll tell the voters the justices hav~ not 
law. We all know that the voters are not going to be 
I submit again that it will lead to a bad 
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elections process. 
What is the "telltale case"? The telltale case is Assembly v. 
Deukmejian.1 He does report that Justice Otto Kaus, one of the most 
respected justices, I submit, in the history of any state in the nation, did 
dissent in that case. He doesn't tell you, and neither does Professor 
Johnson in his pamphlet, that Justice Kaus says, "Obviously much is to 
be said on each side of the only issue that divides the majority and 
Justice Richardson's dissent which I have signed." What was the 
issue? The Democrats had passed a plan, joined by many Republicans 
in the Legislature, and the Governor had signed that plan. The choice 
was, do we use that plan, or do we use the last decade's plan, despite 
its violation of the one person-one vote rule? Professor Barnett says that 
the Reinecke precedent2 was not quite "on all fours." He's absolutely 
right. In the Reinecke case, no plan had been adopted by both the 
Legislature and the governor. The governor had vetoed the plan. It 
would never have gone into effect; therefore, there was no new plan, 
and so the Court went with the old plan. 
I think Justice Kaus is right; Deukmejian was a close case. But 
Professor Barnett's suggestion that the appointment of the pro tern 
justice was a partisan affair is unsupportable. I invite you to read an 
article that appeared in the University of San Francisco Law Review.3 It 
concludes that "the charge that the Chief Justice assigns pro tern justices 
in order to influence the judicial process lacks any evidentiary support." 
The article points out that in the close cases about half the pro tern 
justices have gone with the Chief Justice and half against, 15 to 14 . 
Now, as to the death penalty, Professor Johnson says in his pamphlet 
that he thinks there was no intent requirement in the the law. The district 
attorneys go further; they say the intent requirement was "concocted." 
As the Carlos4 decision recognizes, however, the ballot pamphlet 
clearly shows the existence of an intent requirement. Johnson 
complains that the intent requirement was declared retroactive in 
Garcia. 5 Of course, it is retroactive; it was always a part of the law. 
Here is what the ballot pamphlet said in response to the opponents' 
charge there was no intent requirement: 
"ALRIGHT, LET'S TALK ABOUT FALSE ADVERTISING. 
"The opposition maintains if someone were to lend a screwdriver to 
his neighbor and the neighbor used it to commit a murder the poor 
lender could get the death penalty, even though 'he had NO 
INTENTION that anyone be killed.' 
"Please turn back and read Section 6b ... .it says the person must have 
INTENTIONALLY aided in the commission of a murder to be subject 
to the death penalty under this initiative."6 
It wasn't concocted. It wasn't invented. It was in the ballot pamphlet 
that every voter read. Unfortunately, the ballot pamphlet wasn't written 
into the penal code so judges were not instructing juries about the intent 
requirement. Professor Johnson says the California Supreme Court 
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should not be remanding these cases; the justices .should make their 
own ad hoc judgments as to whether or not there ts enough proof of 
intention. Some of these cases are close, but for the ~ourt to say that 
before a person goes to the death chamber we want a JUry to fin? al~ of 
the elements of the special circumstance i~ a rea~onable determu?-anon. 
In fact, there will be no future cases hke thts b~cause. the. mtent 
requirement is now firmly fixed in the mind of every judge m thts state. 
All right, Professor Johnson, now w~ want to kn?w: whom do you 




1. Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal.3d 638 (1982). 
2. Legislature v. Reinecke, 6 Ca1.3d 595 (1972). 
3. "A Study of Justice Pro Tempore Assignments i~ the. California 
Supreme Court," by Stephanie Wildman, 20 Umverstty of San 
Francisco Law Review 1 ( 1985). 
4. Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.3d 131 (1983). 
5. People v. Garcia, 35 Cal.3d 539 (1984). 
6. Carlos, at 144. 
Phillip E. Johnson 
Rebuttal: 
I WILL resist the temptation to let Shiffrin define my agenda for me. 
You know, this a very different event from what I anticipated last Fall 
when the State Bar convention passed resolutions urging local bar 
associations to sponsor educational programs about the judicial election. 
I believe that what was contemplated at that time was not an educational 
campaign, but a propaganda campaign. Members of the public had been 
saying: "These opinions don't make any sense to me, and these justices 
are doing these things that seem irrational. I cannot understand their 
reasoning, but lawyers tell me that this is just because I haven't had a 
legal education, and if I did I'd approve of what the Court has been 
doing and it would all make sense to me." The bar establishment's 
position seemed to be emerging as: (1) The only legitimate issue is 
competence; (2) any justice is competent who has the ability to write an 
opinion that gives a legal justification for what he or she wants to do; 
(3) members of the public can't judge competence because they do not 
have the necessary education; ( 4) the public therefore has to rely upon 
the Bar leaders who will tell them that all the justices are inherently 
competent; (5) therefore everybody has to vote "yes" on all the justices. 
Today we've gotten something very different from that kind of 
propaganda effort. We've had a full-fledged debate on the merits. That 
a debate of this kind has occurred on this occassion is in itself a victory 
for those of us who are critical of the Court, whatever might be the vote 
on retention in this audience. 
I felt from the start that I could not allow the kind of "educational 
campaign" that Court supporters originally contemplated to occur 
unopposed if there was any way that I could direct attention to the 
substantive issues that are legitimately involved in this campaign. I've 
been teaching law for nearly 20 years now, specializing in the subjects 
with which the California Supreme Court most frequently deals: 
criminal law, criminal procedure, torts and professional responsibility. 
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Over the years, I have become convinced that the decisions of the Court 
have been increasingly politicized and result-oriented. But even more 
than that, the decisions have simply been unwise. They've failed to take 
into account practical problems, and have loaded the system of justice 
with more and more hearings that accomplish little. This excess of 
legalism does not produce more justice; it produces more obstruction, 
more waste, and more inefficiency. I believe that the Court has become 
increasingly remote from an understanding of the experience of 
ordinary citizens, of victims and even of ordinary lawyers. 
Some of the areas in which I disapprove of the Court's performance 
involve good faith disagreement, or a degree of incompetence at worst, 
but in other areas I believe there has been something more than that. I 
believe I have I have identified outright misconduct in the 
reapportionment cases and the death penalty cases, both of which are 
covered in detail in my pamphlet. If what has been done in these areas 
doesn't make sense to the public, it doesn't make sense to me either. 
Should we consider only "competence," meaning the ability to justify 
a decision with a legalistic argument? A good lawyer can write a good 
legalistic argument to justify practically anything. I well remember the 
day when I was called into the office of a very, very famous judge who 
said: "We justices have voted to decide this case in a certain way, based 
on the statute, and I want you to write the opinion." I replied, "But 
Chief, the statute says the exact opposite of what you are deciding." He 
said, "I know it does, but I'm sure you'll think of something to justify 
our decision." And I did. 
(Laughter) 
A good law clerk takes pride in the ability to come up with a plausible 
justification for whatever a judge might want to do. He can't always tell 
very much about how a justice arrives at decisions by reading his or her 
opinions. 
The crucial thing we pay state Supreme Court justices to do is to 
exercise judgment, and I think that the difference between good 
judgment and bad judgment is what this debate really ought to be about. 
I will not talk about the justices otherthan Chief Justice Rose Bird. I 
have opinions about all of them, and I'm not concealing those opinions, 
but for one hour one justice is enough. There are objections to be made 
about several justices, but Chief Justice Bird stands out, in my 
opinion, as having exceptionally poor judgment. The way she has 
managed her campaign is evidence of that, the judicial hearings that 
Professor Barnett referred to are evidence of that, and the pattern of her 
decisions provides the most important evidence. That at any rate is my 
conclusion, but in the end I am only a single voter, just like you. But at 
least we've put the issue to the voters on the substantive issues, 
because the performance of the Court is a legitimate subject of 
controversy and the constitution gives the voters the right to pass their 
judgment. Thank you. 
(Applause) 
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